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Abstract
Digital societies come with a design paradox: On the one hand,
technologies, such as Internet of Things, pervasive and ubiquitous sys-
tems, allow a distributed local intelligence in interconnected devices
of our everyday life such as smart phones, smart thermostats, self-
driving cars, etc. On the other hand, Big Data collection and storage is
managed in a highly centralized fashion, resulting in privacy-intrusion,
surveillance actions, discriminatory and segregation social phenomena.
What is the difference between a distributed and a decentralized sys-
tem design? How ”decentralized” is the processing of our data nowa-
days? Does centralized design undermine autonomy? Can the level of
decentralization in the implemented technologies influence ethical and
social dimensions, such as social justice? Can decentralization convey
sustainability? Are there parallelisms between the decentralization of
digital technology and the decentralization of urban development?
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Rhizome of the Big, Suppression of the Small
Are data actually ”Big” in digital societies? Scratching the surface of Big
Data is used as a philosophical narrative for an in-depth comprehension of
the buzzword, the actual design it conveys and the techno-socio-economic
implications of this design.
1This essay is based on material presented at the 2016 Salon Festival, Maloja
Palace, Switzerland: In Pursuit of the Beautiful Soul, The Public Sphere Salons,
https://www.publicspheresalons.com
1
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) such as Internet of
Things, ubiquitous and pervasive computing, wearable devices and other
have brought paramount opportunities for sustainable digital societies in
application domains such as Smart Cities, Smart Grids and ambient-assisted
living. Digital societies provide functionality and services that reason based
on empirical data. The vast majority of these data can be generated locally
by each citizen who uses the aforementioned ICT technologies. Given that
nowadays most citizens in developed and developing countries have access to
some of these technologies, the data generation is highly participatory and
decentralized by design. The data corresponding to each citizen are only a
small fraction of the total data generated at a global scale. Therefore, the
proportion of data corresponding to each citizen is nowadays magnitudes
lower compared to the past when the participatory actions based on ICT
were minimal and only large corporations could have access to these costly
technologies. We ultimately live in an era of ”Small Data”.
So what makes the ”Small Data” ”Big”? Does Big Data convey a mis-
conception or a paradox? Big Data is actually a rhizome of massive data
collection practices governed by large corporations or governments whose
systems design is highly detached from the decentralized nature of data
generation. This practice suppresses and eventually undermines the inher-
ent decentralized design of digital societies. Although Big Data technologies
claim decentralized/distributed processing of data using programming mod-
els such as MapReduce, these technologies are actually deployed and used
in highly centralized settings. Data are collected, stored and processed in
large energy-intensive data centers, over which citizens have no control and
authority. Distributed data processing within this highly centralized setting
exclusively serves corporate performance and competitiveness. However,
given the current economic arena, only a few powerful business players can
invest on such expensive computational resources. This results in a cascade
of centralization and power concentration as a tactical utility2 mingled in
technical, social, business, economic and political realities. The sustainabil-
ity and cohesion of digital societies comes in question.
The Ongoing Battle Behind the New Manifestation
The debate on centralized vs. decentralized design dates back to non-
digital societies and its existence has philosophical relevance and signifi-
cance. Cummings [1995] relies on semantic decomposition to argue that
the two terms are a binary undecidable opposition. They cannot be con-
2Cummings [1995] recalls former organization theorists with this view for the future
digital societies.
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ceptualized apart from each other due to the intrinsically divided logic of
writing. This creates inherently cyclic dynamics in the perceptions between
centralization and decentralization. This philosophical view has reflections
in empirical observations on fiscal, administrative, regulatory, market and
financial centralization/decentralization of public services [De Vries, 2000,
Ahmad et al., 2005]. It is even pointed out that the same arguments are
used to support either centralization or decentralization and that oppos-
ing arguments appear to support the same view among different countries.
These contradicting views also have ideological origins, for instance, refer-
ences to decentralization swing over anarchism, libertarian socialism and
even neo-liberalism.
Gershenson and Heylighen [2005] illustrate the perspective of complexity
science that moves beyond distinction conservation of classical sciences [Heylighen,
1989] and introduces the indeterminacy in which observations or distinctions
made by observers in different contexts can vary. Beyond the prevalent con-
ceptual applicability of indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, the indetermi-
nancy between centralization and decentralization becomes more apparent
when studying topological and spectral properties of complex networks rep-
resenting techno-socio-economic systems [Provan and Kenis, 2008, Strogatz,
2001, Boccaletti et al., 2006, Albert and Baraba´si, 2002].
Cascade Effects of Design
Significant challenges that digital societies face nowadays stem from their
design. For example, practices of privacy violation are a major concern
in the Big Data era. Privacy can be violated (i) as a result of low citi-
zens’ awereness about the implications of giving away their personal data or
(ii) by advanced inference techniques applied to partial/incomplete citizens’
data. In both cases, centralization plays a key role. These privacy violations
are a structural effect originated from the centralized design in information
management.
In the former case, complex privacy settings and policies in data collec-
tion are a mainstream that keep citizens under-informed about which of their
personal data are collected and how they are used. Even when some privacy
control is given back to citizens, this is counter-intuitively institutionalized
and determined by the centralized authority that collects the data, the same
potential violator of privacy. The notion of conflict of interest does not apply
in this case. This centrally determined privacy control can ironically turn
out be deceiving or opportunistic as choices about privacy are personal data
collected as well. For example, the control of which friends can see a picture
uploaded in a centralized social network reveals a level of trust, a ranking of
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human relationships camouflaged under a notion of privacy determination.
At the end, most social networks may allow each individual to choose what
is shared with everyone else except themselves. In conclusion, unless citi-
zens self-institute and self-determine information sharing, centralized data
collection cannot by design contribute to citizens’ awareness in privacy and
can even further violate their privacy.
In the latter case of privacy intrusion via inference, it is again the cen-
tralized design that opens up ways to violate privacy. Inference is usu-
ally performed by deducing some missing or new type of information by
using analysis of data sources. For example, identifying the TV channel
and audio-visual content does not require the explicit reveal of this infor-
mation by household residents. Surprisingly, it can be also inferred with
high accuracy using household energy consumption data captured by smart
meters [Greveler et al., 2012]. Privacy threats by inference are even more
challenging for citizens to perceive, and therefore, to be aware of. Usually,
privacy policies do not explicitly reflect on such threats. It is when different
collected data streams are centralized and processed by powerful compu-
tational resources that unlimited inference opportunities arise. When data
remain distributed and under citizens’ control, inference is either literally
or computationally infeasible. Decentralization entails a significant level
of privacy-by-design, and can be adopted as a tactical utility for privacy-
preservation.
Privacy intrusion has a cascade of implications on autonomy of decision
making, individuals’ freedom and therefore, democracy [Helbing and Pournaras,
2015]. In a digital society of centralized information systems, new pow-
erful ways of surveillance, discrimination, manipulation of public opinion
and totalitarian e-governance emerge. Highly commercialized recommender
systems or over/under-regulated computational markets often lack of a le-
gitimate transparent access to citizens’ data. As a result, the semiotics of
information in opinion formation and decision-making are fundamentally
altered [Eco, 2014].
The Oxymoron of Sustainability
Centralization also has an environmental impact. For example, the carbom
emmisions of datacenters account for 14% of the ICT footprint [Webb et al.,
2008], 2% of all electricity usage in the USA and 1.3% globally [Brown et al.,
2008]. There is an active ongoing research on energy efficiency and savings of
centralized computing infrastructures [Beloglazov et al., 2011], however, the
energy consumption of data centers continues to grow [Brown et al., 2008].
Energy efficiency in data centers cannot justify sustainability as the un-
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derlying environmental manifestation of the centralized design smolders un-
noticed. If privacy could be preserved, data centers might not be needed at
first place, or at least to the scale they are required nowadays. Beyond the
ethical dimension, privacy violations such as the ones illustrated earlier have
a measurable environmental impact as they require storage and processing
capacity. Even if these computational resources are environmental-friendly,
sustainability remains an oxymoron. Moreover, the need for a large-scale use
of centralized data centers can be further limited if the underutilized disk
space and processing capacity of personal computers and other distributed
computational resources are explored [Benet, 2014, Swan, 2015]. Decentral-
izing the energy efficiency by focusing on environmental-friendly end-user
technology can be a more effective and sustainable approach [Wang et al.,
2009, Nurminen and Noyranen, 2008, Pantazis et al., 2013, Pournaras, 2013,
Pournaras et al., 2014a].
The design bond between physical and digital finds another manifesta-
tion in the development of rural and urban environments. The centralization
of information systems results in large ICT corporations physically close to
administrative centers of cities, where they can sustain their business activ-
ities. This results in a further alienation of rural areas and losses of their
competitive advantages. Undoubtedly and regardless of the design of infor-
mation systems, citizens can benefit from higher quality of public services
supported by digital means [Kostakis et al., 2015]. However, rather than
Smart Towns or Smart Villages, it is no wonder that Smart Cities are the
mainstream nowadays. Although the status quo suggests the city as the
incubator of innovation, a more physiocratic view would mandate the repa-
triation of the innovation outcome in rural areas for reflecting the benefits to
real economy and growth [Heinonen, 2013]. Such considerations are highly
applicable in countries of the European South affected by the economic crisis
and especially Greece that has a high level of urbanization, nevertheless an
economy relying on primary sector of the economy.
Claiming the ‘Self’
Eco [2014] argues that true control in communication comes from the ac-
tual control of information meaning and its interpretation. This turns in-
formation from an instrument for producing economic merchandise into a
chief merchandise. The tactical centralization in the Big Data era cre-
ates unlimited opportunities for control over meaning and its interpreta-
tion. The suppression of the inherent decentralized design of digital soci-
eties, along with the magma of power concentration by the centralization of
information systems undermines the ’self’ of self-instituting societies. Con-
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sequently, the foundations of democracy are undermined, as Castoriadis
sees to the self-instituting societies the dawn of democracy back to ancient
Greece [Castoriadis, 1983, Castoriadis and Curtis, 1991].
This discussion does not imply that decentralization is a panacea and
centralized design the cause of an upcoming dystopian future. Decentral-
ized systems such as peer-to-peer networks have been criticized for the
security holes, free-riding or illegal content sharing [Wallach, 2003]. Sev-
eral of these issues are addressed by new novel decentralized technologies
such as blockchain [Swan, 2015], while others are a result of the existing
well-established economic and political interests opposing a transition to-
wards decentralization. Distinguishing between a weak outcome because of
the transition to decentralization and a weak outcome because of a fun-
damental flaw in the actual decentralized design is a challenge to be ad-
dressed [Ahmad et al., 2005].
There is a plethora of applications in which decentralized information
systems are an alternative or a natural fit within the domain applied. For
example, decentralized micro-generation of energy empowers citizens to be
both consumers and producers. Centralized computations for matching en-
ergy supply and demand in this dynamic decentralized environment can
undermine privacy and autonomy as discussed earlier. In contrast, the reli-
ability of Smart Grids can improve via self-organizing multi-agent systems
running decentralized optimization mechanisms. Decentralization does not
only contribute to cost-effectiveness but also to a welfare by minimizing hu-
man discomfort and maximizing social fairness [Pournaras et al., 2014a,b].
Similarly, data analytics are not a monopoly of Big Data systems. Mea-
surements can also be performed in a fully decentralized fashion as a public
good using collective intelligence distributed over computational resources
of participatory citizens [Pournaras et al., 2018, 2015, Jesus et al., 2015].
Although the battle of decentralization in the Big Data era may resemble
a digital guerrilla warfare, this battle is actually the claim of the missing
‘self’ from self-instituting digital societies, the claim of a digital democracy
worth pursuing.
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